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THOUGHTS FROM CANADA • A COURT REVIEW COLUMN

The Death of Mandatory Minimum
Periods of Imprisonment in Canada?
Wayne K. Gorman

O

ver the last number of years, the Government of
Canada (which has exclusive constitutional jurisdiction over criminal law in Canada) enacted various
pieces of legislation mandating the imposition of mandatory
minimum periods of imprisonment for specific offences contained within the Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985. This
has included:
– the Safe Streets and Communities Act, S.C. 2012, c 1
(which imposed mandatory minimum penalties for certain sexual offences against children and which
amended the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, R.S.C.
1985, to provide for minimum penalties for certain drug
offences)1; and
– the Increasing Offenders’ Accountability for Victims Act,
S.C. 2013, c 11 (which requires that a minimum “victim
surcharge” be imposed on all offenders regardless of
ability to pay).2
THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

These legislative initiatives have been subjected to constitutional challenge. These challenges have primarily been based
Footnotes
1. In R. v. R. (E.R.D.), 2016 BCSC 684, 2016 CarswellBC 1055, ¶ 31
(Can. B.C.), it was held that “although the minimum one-year
mandatory sentence required by s. 271(a) [sexual assault] is not
grossly disproportionate for [E.R.D.R.], it would be grossly disproportionate for reasonably foreseeable less-serious offenders
whose conduct would be captured by s. 271(a). Consequently, I
find that s. 271(a) violates s. 12 of the Charter.” In R. v. Badali,
2016 ONSC 788, 2016 CarswellOnt 1550 (Can. Ont.), it was
declared that the minimum-sentence provisions in sections
212(2) and 212(4) of the Criminal Code (living off of the avails of
prostitution with respect to a female under 18 years of age) violated section 12 of the Charter and were of no force and effect.
2. In R. v. Flaro, 2014 ONCJ 2, 2014 CarswellOnt 192 (Can. Ont.),
it was held that the amendments made to section 737 of the Criminal Code by the Increasing Offenders’ Accountability for Victims Act
violated sections 7 and 12 of the Charter and were therefore of no
force or effect. It was held that the mandatory nature of the victim surcharge constituted “cruel and unusual punishment.” It has
been suggested that this type of legislation “purports to rank,
explicitly or implicitly, the objectives of sentencing by normative
priority,” and, therefore, it is “no exaggeration to claim that the
effect of the amendments is to amend or repeal, expressly or
impliedly, the principles and objectives enumerated in Part XXIII
that were stated by Parliament in 1995 and later developed in the
jurisprudence” (Patrick Healy, Sentencing from There to Here and
from Then to Now, 17 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 291, 300 (2013)).
3. See R. v. Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96 (Can.).
4. In R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, ¶¶ 70-71, the Supreme Court
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upon section 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, 1982 (the Charter). Section 12 states:
“Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment.”
In Canada, if a court finds that a legislative enactment violates section 12 of the Charter, the court must issue a declaration of invalidity pursuant to section 52(1) of the Charter.3
Section 52(1) indicates that “any law that is inconsistent with
the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the
inconsistency, of no force or effect.” However, a finding of such
an inconsistency does not automatically lead to a declaration
of invalidity. Canadian courts are also required to determine if
the legislation can be “saved” by section 1 of the Charter. That
section states: “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to
such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”4
Section 12 of the Charter has been the subject of significant
commentary by the Supreme Court of Canada. As will be seen,
the Supreme Court’s latest pronouncements may suggest that
all legislation mandating the imposition of a minimum period
of imprisonment will be unconstitutional.
held that the test to be applied pursuant to section 1 of the Charter involves three elements:
To establish that a limit is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society, two central criteria must
be satisfied. First, the objective, which the measures responsible for a limit on a Charter right or freedom are designed to
serve, must be “of sufficient importance to warrant overriding
a constitutionally protected right or freedom” . . . .
Second, once a sufficiently significant objective is recognized, then the party invoking s. 1 must show that the means
chosen are reasonable and demonstrably justified. This
involves “a form of proportionality test”: R. v. Big M Drug Mart
Ltd., [[1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 352]. Although the nature of the
proportionality test will vary depending on the circumstances,
in each case courts will be required to balance the interests of
society with those of individuals and groups. There are, in my
view, three important components of a proportionality test.
First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed to
achieve the objective in question. They must not be arbitrary,
unfair or based on irrational considerations. In short, they
must be rationally connected to the objective. Second, the
means, even if rationally connected to the objective in this
first sense, should impair “as little as possible” the right or
freedom in question: R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., supra, at p.
352. Third, there must be a proportionality between the
effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the
Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been
identified as of “sufficient importance”.

Let us start with a brief review of how the Supreme Court
has interpreted section 12 of the Charter, and then we will look
at its most recent decision before attempting to determine the
effect of the Supreme Court’s decisions on the ability of the
Canadian Government to enact mandatory periods of imprisonment for specific criminal offences.
THE EARLY DECISIONS

The Supreme Court of Canada’s initial consideration of section 12 of the Charter occurred in R. v. Smith.5 In Smith, the
Court held that a seven-year minimum-sentencing provision
that applied to the offence of importing narcotics under section
5(1) of the Narcotic Control Act, R.S.C. 1970, violated section
12 of the Charter. The Court held that the protection afforded
by section 12 of the Charter “governs the quality of the punishment and is concerned with the effect that the punishment
may have on the person on whom it is imposed.”6 The Court
described the test to be applied when attempting to determine
if a sentencing provision violated section 12 of the Charter in
the following manner:
The test for review under s. 12 of the Charter is one of
gross disproportionality, because it is aimed at punishments that are more than merely excessive. We should
be careful not to stigmatize every disproportionate or
excessive sentence as being a constitutional violation,
and should leave to the usual sentencing appeal process
the task of reviewing the fitness of a sentence. Section 12
will only be infringed where the sentence is so unfit having regard to the offence and the offender as to be grossly
disproportionate.7
This test was subsequently affirmed and applied in R. v.
Lyons,8 R. v. Luxton,9 Steele v. Mountain Institution,10 R. v. Goltz,11
R. v. Morrisey,12 and R. v. Latimer.13 In Goltz, the Court indicated
that “although not in themselves decisive to a determination of
gross disproportionality, other factors which may legitimately
inform an assessment are whether the punishment is necessary
to achieve a valid penal purpose, whether it is founded on recognized sentencing principles, whether there exist valid alternatives to the punishment imposed, and to some extent
whether a comparison with punishments imposed for other
crimes in the same jurisdiction reveals great disproportion.”14
In Latimer, the Court held that the mandatory period of parole
ineligibility (10 years) prescribed by the Criminal Code for second-degree murder did not violate section 12 of the Charter.
In Ferguson, the Court held that the imposition of the fouryear mandatory minimum sentence for manslaughter with a
firearm did not violate section 12 of the Charter. The Court
also held that a constitutional exemption is not an appropriate
remedy for a section 12 violation. The Court concluded that if

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

[1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (Can.).
Id. ¶ 53.
Id. ¶ 54.
[1987] 2 S.C.R. 309 (Can.)
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 711 (Can.)
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 1385 (Can.)
[1991] 3 S.C.R. 485 (Can.)

a minimum sentence is found to be unconstitutional, the law
imposing the sentence is inconsistent with the Charter and
therefore falls under section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
R. v. NUR

Last year, the Supreme Court considered section 12 of the
Charter in R. v. Nur.15 In Nur, the accused were convicted of the
offence of possession of a prohibited/restricted weapon with
ammunition, contrary to section 95(1) of the Criminal Code.
The minimum prescribed penalty for this offence (see section
95(2)(a)) was three years imprisonment for a first offence and
five years imprisonment for a second or subsequent offence.
The Court noted that it “has set a high bar for what constitutes
‘cruel and unusual . . . punishment’ under s. 12 of the Charter. A sentence attacked on this ground must be grossly disproportionate to the punishment that is appropriate, having
regard to the nature of the offence and the circumstances of the
offender.”16
The Supreme Court held in Nur that “a challenge to a
mandatory minimum sentencing provision on the ground it
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12 of the
Charter involves two steps”:
In summary, when a mandatory minimum sentencing
provision is challenged, two questions arise. The first is
whether the provision results in a grossly disproportionate sentence on the individual before the court. If the
answer is no, the second question is whether the provision’s reasonably foreseeable applications will impose
grossly disproportionate sentences on others. This is
consistent with the settled jurisprudence on constitutional review and rules of constitutional interpretation,
which seek to determine the potential reach of a law; is
workable; and provides sufficient certainty.17
The Court explained that the “reasonable foreseeability test
is not confined to situations that are likely to arise in the general day-to-day application of the law. Rather, it asks what situations may reasonably arise. It targets circumstances that are
foreseeably captured by the minimum conduct caught by the
offence. Only situations that are ‘remote’ or ‘far-fetched’ are
excluded.”18
In Nur, the Court held that section 95(2)(a) violated section
12 of the Charter because for certain offenders “a three-year
sentence is grossly disproportionate to the sentence the conduct would otherwise merit under the sentencing provisions of
the Criminal Code”:
At the far end of the range, stands the licensed and
responsible gun owner who stores his unloaded firearm
safely with ammunition nearby, but makes a mistake as

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

2000 SCC 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90 (Can.)
2001 SCC 1, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3 (Can.)
Goltz, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 485, ¶ 27.
2015 SCC 15, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 773 (Can.).
Id. ¶ 39.
Id. ¶ 77.
Id. ¶ 68.
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to where it can be stored. For this offender, a three-year
sentence is grossly disproportionate to the sentence the
conduct would otherwise merit under the sentencing
provisions of the Criminal Code.19
THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA’S MOST RECENT
SECTION 12 DECISION

Earlier this year, the Supreme Court once again considered
section 12 of the Charter.
In R. v. Lloyd,20 the accused was convicted in the Provincial
Court of the offence of possession of a controlled substance for
the purpose of trafficking. Because of a prior conviction for a
similar offence, he was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of one year of imprisonment pursuant to section
5(3)(a)(i)(D) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. The
sentencing judge declared this provision to be contrary to section 12 of the Charter and not justified under section 1.

imprisonment violated section 12 of the Charter on the basis
that it “‘casts its net over a wide range of potential conduct’
. . . . As a result, it catches not only the serious drug trafficking that is its proper aim, but conduct that is much less blameworthy. This renders it constitutionally vulnerable.”23
This is very strong and broad language. The suggestion by
the Court to as to how Parliament might wish to draft its future
legislation may not bode well for future mandatory minimums
being upheld.24
SECTION 1

The Supreme Court concluded that the provision was not
saved by section 1 of the Charter:
Parliament’s objective—to combat the distribution of
illicit drugs—is unquestionably an important objective:
R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at p. 141. This objective
is rationally connected to the imposition of a one-year
mandatory minimum sentence for the offence of possession for the purpose of trafficking of Schedule I drugs.
However, the law does not minimally impair the s. 12
right. As discussed above, the law covers a wide array of
situations of varying moral blameworthiness, without
differentiation or exemption, save for the single exception in s. 10(5) of the CDSA. The Crown has not established that less harmful means to achieve Parliament’s
objective of combatting the distribution of illicit drugs,
whether by narrowing the reach of the law or by providing for judicial discretion in exceptional cases, were not
available. Nor has it shown that the impact of the limit
on offenders deprived of their rights is proportionate to
the good flowing from their inclusion in the law.25

THE MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCE RULED TO BE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL

On appeal, the Supreme Court indicated:
[T]he reality is this: mandatory minimum sentences that,
as here, apply to offences that can be committed in various
ways, under a broad array of circumstances and by a wide
range of people are vulnerable to constitutional challenge.
This is because such laws will almost inevitably include an
acceptable reasonable hypothetical for which the mandatory minimum will be found unconstitutional. If Parliament hopes to sustain mandatory minimum penalties for
offences that cast a wide net, it should consider narrowing
their reach so that they only catch offenders that merit the
mandatory minimum sentences.21

CONSIDERATION OF NUR AND LLOYD

The Supreme Court also suggested that another “solution
would be for Parliament to build a safety valve that would
allow judges to exempt outliers for whom the mandatory minimum will constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Residual
judicial discretion for exceptional cases is a technique widely
used to avoid injustice and constitutional infirmity in other
countries.”22 The Supreme Court of Canada concluded the
challenged mandatory minimum sentence of one year of

Lloyd was applied in R. v. Elliott,26 in which it was held that
section 7(2)(b)(i) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act
(which requires the imposition of a minimum sentence of six
months imprisonment for the offence of production of marihuana) violated section 12 of the Charter.
Nur was recently considered by the British Columbia Court
of Appeal in R. v. Dickey.27
In Dickey, the accused were charged with the offences of traf-

19. Id. ¶ 82. In Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003), the defendant
was convicted of the offence of grand theft and sentenced to a
term of 25 years to life under the state of California’s three-strikes
law. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District,
affirmed the sentence, and the California Supreme Court denied
review. Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court of the
United States. The Supreme Court held that the sentence did not
violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. At page 1190, the Court stated:

the three strikes law, is not grossly disproportionate and
therefore does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. The judgment of
the California Court of Appeal is affirmed.
2016 SCC 13 (Can.)
Id. ¶ 35.
Id. ¶ 36. See Levi Vandersteen, Building a Safety Valve for Mandatory Minimums: How to Construct a Statutory Exemption Scheme, 27
CRIM. REP. (7th) 249 (2016).
Id. ¶ 27.
In Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), the Supreme Court of
the United States held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the
imposition of a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile
offender who did not commit homicide.
Lloyd, 2016 SCC 13, ¶ 49.
2016 BCSC 1135, 2016 CarswellBC 1672 (Can. B.C.).
2016 BCCA 177, 2016 CarswellBC 1107 (Can. B.C.).

Ewing’s is not “the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed
leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.” Harmelin,
501 U.S., at 1005, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
We hold that Ewing’s sentence of 25 years to life in
prison, imposed for the offense of felony grand theft under
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20.
21.
22.

23.
24.

25.
26.
27.

ficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking, contrary to
section 5(3) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. The
offences were committed in a public place usually frequented by
persons under the age of 18 years or by using the services of a
person under the age of 18 years or with the involvement of
such a person. Sections 5(3)(a)(ii)(A) and (C) of Controlled
Drugs and Substances Act provide for a minimum two-year
prison sentence when an offence is committed in or near a
school, on or near school grounds, or in or near any other public place usually frequented by persons under the age of 18
years; or using the services of, or involving, such a person.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal concluded that “in
some circumstances, s. 5(3)(a)(ii)(A) and (C) would constitute cruel and unusual punishment and accordingly infringe s.
12 of the Charter because a minimum two-year prison sentence would be grossly disproportionate to an appropriate sentencing disposition. They would do so in a way that cannot be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society such
that they are of no force or effect.”28
The Court of Appeal concluded that in Dickey, a sentence of
six months imprisonment was appropriate. They concluded
that the imposition of the minimum two-year sentence would
infringe section 12 of the Charter:
The imposition of a two-year prison sentence in a federal penitentiary would not only be a disproportionate
punishment, but one that would be grossly so if imposed
on Dickey (and more so on a younger hypothetical
offender) when compared to an appropriate sentence. In
determining whether a minimum sentence is grossly disproportionate, the comparison of the appropriate sentence and the statutory minimum sentence to be
imposed would seem to always be the first consideration,
as it was in Nur. There are contextual factors to consider
that may have a bearing on the determination in any
given instance, but there would appear to be none that
would render a minimum two-year prison sentence for
Dickey other than grossly disproportionate. As the judge
concluded, it does infringe s. 12 of the Charter.29
The Court of Appeal concluded that “while the section has
a pressing and substantial objective, being the protection of
young people from the drug trade, it cannot be said that it is

28. Id. ¶ 11.
29. Id. ¶ 68. In Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 957 (1991), the
offender was convicted of possessing more than 650 grams of
cocaine and was sentenced to a mandatory term of life in prison
without possibility of parole. The Supreme Court held that imposition of the mandatory sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
30. Id. ¶ 73.
31. 2016 BCCA 332, 2016 CarswellBC 2090 (Can. B.C.).
32. In Badali, 2016 ONSC 788, ¶ 66, for instance, in declaring that the
minimum-sentence provisions in sections 212(2) and 212(4) of the
Criminal Code (living off of the avails of prostitution with respect to
a female under 18 years of age) violated section 12 of the Charter
and were of no force and effect, the application judge referred to the
following unlikely hypothetical in support of the ruling:

proportional to that objective because, while there may be a
rational connection to what are the penological objectives of
denunciation and deterrence, the section does not constitute a
minimal impairment of the right infringed and the deleterious
and salutary effects of it are not proportional.”30 However, in R.
v. Oud,31 the British Columbia Court of Appeal in applying
Lloyd held that the four-year mandatory minimum period of
imprisonment for the offence of intentionally discharging a
firearm into a place knowing or being reckless as to whether
another person is present, contrary to section 244.2(1) of the
Criminal Code, did not infringe section 12 of the Charter.
CONCLUSION

The broad language utilized by the Supreme Court in Lloyd
and the Court’s use of hypotheticals that are not related to the
actual offender and that are not likely to arise in the general
day-to-day application of the law suggests that mandatory
minimum periods of imprisonment will always be vulnerable
to constitutional challenge.32 For instance, in a minority judgment authored by three of the justices in Lloyd, it was suggested that some of the hypotheticals utilized by the majority
“were ‘far-fetched’ or ‘marginally imaginable’, and thus inappropriate for the s. 12 analysis.”33 The minority also suggested
that the majority’s opinion constituted “a departure from the
Court’s jurisprudence, which has consistently maintained that
mandatory minimums are not per se unconstitutional.”34
Indeed, as we have seen, Nur and Lloyd appear to have
taken an approach that suggests mandatory minimum periods
of imprisonment will be consistently declared to be unconstitutional in Canada.

Wayne Gorman is a judge of the Provincial
Court of Newfoundland and Labrador. His
blog (Keeping Up is Hard to Do: A Trial
Judge’s Reading Blog) can be found on the web
page of the Canadian Association of Provincial
Court Judges. He also writes a regular column (Of Particular Interest to Provincial
Court Judges) for the Canadian Provincial
Judges’ Journal. Judge Gorman’s work has been widely published. Comments or suggestions to Judge Gorman may be sent to
wgorman@provincial.court.nl.ca.

Another example that comes to mind is a young couple who
have encountered hard times and conclude that their only
salvation is if the female partner engages in sexual experiences for money and her male partner acts to draw in customers. And the female partner is under 18 years of age. She
is the one to suggest this economic salvation. The male is
arrested and charged with living on the avails of prostitution. In such a situation, the public might very well conclude that the framers of the law never intended the legislation to apply to the male partner.
33. Lloyd, 2016 SCC 13, ¶ 91.
34. Id. ¶ 106. See Don Stuart, Pragmatism and Inconsistency from the
Supreme Court on Mandatory Minimums, 27 CRIM. REP. (7th) 245
(2016).
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